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Fichte’s Practical Response to the
Problem of Other Minds
Matthew C. Altman
1 In our everyday lives, there is no doubt that we have moral obligations to other people.
There are  those  at  the margins  of  personhood –  fetuses  and the severely  mentally
disabled, perhaps even some higher animals – but the typical person with all of his or
her faculties is the paradigm case of a morally considerable being. If we pursue this
further,  however,  we  find  that  it  is  difficult  to  justify  the  attribution  of  mental
predicates  to  anyone  but  myself.  Traditionally,  this  has  been  a  major  issue  at  the
intersection of epistemology and ethics, because whether we should consider someone
in our moral deliberations is often thought to depend on their cognitive abilities or
their capacity for consciousness.
2 According to Fichte, the problem of other minds is one of the most important questions
that philosophy can address (EPW 153 [GA I/3:34]).1 For both Kant and Fichte, we have
direct moral duties only to other rational beings. The fact that the other is present to us
as a representation (for Kant) or as a Not-I that is posited in opposition to the I (for
Fichte)  threatens  our  supposed  moral  obligations  to  them  and  risks  a  form  of
metaphysical solipsism and moral egoism. The bindingness of interpersonal obligations
depends on overcoming the separation between me and other persons.
3 Fichte claims that Kant’s neglect of this problem is “the most striking demonstration of
the incompleteness of Kant’s Critical philosophy” (NM 303 [K 150]). What little response
Kant does give is unsatisfactory. For Kant, the reality of my own freedom follows in a
practical sense from my immediate sense of moral constraint, but the reality of others’
freedom is unavailable to me, both theoretically and practically. Kant is left only with
“marks” of rationality that correlate with but do not entail others’ personhood.
4 By contrast, Fichte contends that the only way out of this problem is to appeal to our
practical commitments. Some interpreters of Fichte have drawn upon the summons
(Aufforderung)  as  an  original,  non-derivative  basis  on  which  to  establish  my  moral
obligation to others. Although the summons can establish the personhood of the other,
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and thus addresses one facet of the problem of other minds, Fichte claims that it has no
distinctively moral implications.
5 In order to establish the other as a morally considerable being,  Fichte reverses the
direction of  implication:  I  do not derive my moral  duties from others’  personhood;
rather,  others’  personhood  follows  from  my  immediate  sense  of  moral  obligation
toward them. The way that the problem of other minds is posed presupposes that the
only  appropriate  answer  would  be  a  series  of  propositions  that  establishes  the
existence of other morally considerable beings outside of myself. The immediate moral
feeling of considerability, however, is not a proposition. Fichte thus provides a radically
different alternative to Kant’s approach. The problem of other minds is not answered
or  solved  but  is  rather  dispelled  in  Fichte’s  philosophy  by  the  feeling  of  moral
obligation and the recognition of others as the object of our obligations.
 
Kant on Our Ignorance of Others’ Humanity
6 Kant’s transcendental idealism is innovative in its explanation of how personhood is
metaphysically possible, but it is all-too-traditional in its account of how the other is
epistemically  available.  Kant  defines  a  person  as  “a  subject  whose  actions  can  be
imputed to him,” and moral personality in particular as “the freedom of a rational being
under moral laws” (MM 6:223). It follows that we cannot know whether there are other
persons (or even whether I  am a person) because we can only know things as they
appear to us, things appear to us according to the concept of causality, and complete
causal necessity entails universal determinism. Considered empirically, human beings
are bound by the same natural laws as other things (MM 6:223).
7 If our actions were entirely determined, we would have no moral obligations. Not only
would we be incapable of  moral  agency,  but nothing and no one would be morally
considerable,  because  only  rational  beings  have  absolute,  non-instrumental  value.
When  rational  end-setters  (if  there  is  such  a  thing)  decide  to  do  something,  they
designate  it  as  worthy  of  pursuit.  Therefore,  moral  agents  ought  to  promote the
capacity to set ends, because it is a condition of things being good for them. This is the
reasoning behind Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative, the formula of
humanity, which enjoins us to treat the humanity in a person always as an end in itself
and never merely as a means (G 4:429). Kant equates the class of moral patients, beings
to whom one has duties, with the class of moral agents – what Christina Hoff calls the
“patient-agent parity thesis.”2 So, we must determine whether beings who look and
behave like responsible beings are in fact agents in order to determine whether they
are morally considerable.
8 Famously, Kant says that he “had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith,”
meaning that limiting our knowledge to appearances implies that the reality of human
freedom is  not  logically  ruled  out  (Bxxx;  see  also  A557-58/B586-87;  CPrR  5:72,  94).
Rational  self-determination  is  possible  if  we  consider  ourselves  apart  from  our
epistemic conditions. However, here Kant finds himself at an impasse: our epistemic
limits make it impossible for me to know whether I or anyone else is a rational agent,
since I can know myself and others only as appearances – in inner sense and outer
sense, respectively. Yet my moral obligations extend only to those who are rational
agents. Other minds thus pose a problem for Kant that is even more radical than the
original problem: I cannot even know (theoretically) that I am free, so I can’t know if I 
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am a morally considerable being. Without knowing if  there are any moral agents,  I
cannot determine the scope of my duties or whether I am able to choose rightly or
wrongly.
9 In the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant shows that freedom is possible, but he concludes
that  I  cannot  know  whether  anyone  is  in  fact  free.  It  is  not  until  the  Kritik  der
praktischen Vernunft that he establishes the practical reality of freedom by appealing to
the fact of reason. I cannot help but act with a consideration of what I ought to do, and
that immediate sense of moral constraint justifies a practical commitment to my own
freedom, even though I cannot know (in a theoretical sense) whether I am free (CPrR
5:32, 48, 55, 56).
10 Even if we grant that this appeal to the fact of reason works as an argument, what
follows is a limited conclusion. I have a practical basis for thinking that I am a rational
being,  so I  can justify self-regarding duties.  However,  I  cannot know whether what
appear  to  be  other  persons  are  conscious  of  their  motives  or  experience  moral
constraint. In the words of Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s transcendental idealism amounts
to a “methodological solipsism” that “forbid[s] him to take for granted the ways in
which we do – or even the fact that we do – apply mental predicates to others.”3 I may
have obligations to others, but on Kant’s own terms, I have no reason to believe that
they are rational beings to whom I owe such things. Kant sets this up as a matter of
justification: I must warrant a commitment even to my own freedom, and I justify this
commitment on practical grounds. How, then, do I warrant a commitment to others’
freedom, and thus their humanity?
 
Kant on Empirical Correlates of Free Willing
11 Because  I  only  have  practical  faith  in  my  own  freedom  from  the  first-person
perspective, I must try to establish the existence of other minds through my knowledge
of  them  as  representations.  Kant  only  explicitly  addresses  this  issue  in  the
Transcendental  Dialectic  and  in  his  work  on  anthropology,  where  he  claims  that
apparent “signs [Zeichen]” (A359, A546/B574; An 7:192, 285) or “marks [Merkmale]” (Ak
25:1156)  indicate  that  a  person  is  rational  and  spontaneously  self-determining.  H.
Tristram Engelhardt, Carol Van Kirk, and Patrick Frierson have all appealed to these
signs to defend Kant against the threat of solipsism and to justify my sense of moral
obligation  to  others,  although  they  have  appealed  to  different  signs  that  indicate
different mental capabilities.
12 Frierson appeals to signs of cognition. According to Kant, free actions have motives
that are based in the understanding rather than stimuli (LM 29:1014-15), so Frierson
says that we should consider those beings to be free whose marks indicate the presence
of  higher cognitive faculties,  such as  the use of  concepts.4 For  example,  the use of
language, by which people express concepts, distinguishes human beings from animals
that  act  purely  on  instinct:  “All  language  is  a  signification  of  thought
[Gedankenbezeichnung]” (An 7:192-93; see also 7:155). Similarly, Engelhardt argues that
“one can infer from observation of the behavior (including verbal behavior) of certain
objects  that  they  are  associated  with  phenomena  of  inner  sense.”5 For  example,  if
someone appears to consider others and give reasons for their decisions, I then use
“the psychological idea” in a regulative way to unify the phenomena as expressions of
the person’s inner sense, much as we use reflective judgment to unify living things as
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organisms using the idea of natural purposes. This precludes our conceiving of others
merely  as  determined  things  without  consciousness,  and  it  “supplies  the  further
extension of theoretical knowledge integral to the employment of practical reason.”6
13 Van Kirk takes a different approach, directly appealing to signs of moral deliberation:
personhood is indicated by “the fact that the agent perceives himself as faced with a
choice. … The fact that some object gives evidence that its actions are, or could be,
performed because they ought to be performed is sufficient ground for imputing to that
object  self-consciousness  and  reason.”7 For  Kant,  the  immediate  sense  of  moral
constraint entails that I must consider myself to be free from the practical perspective;
for  Van  Kirk,  the  presence  of  what  appears  to  be  moral  constraint  in  a  person  –
weighing reasons (or saying that he is weighing reasons?), struggling with inclinations
(furrowing his brow?), and so on – entails that I am justified in attributing humanity to
him.
 
Problems with the Appeal to Signs
14 The first response to Frierson’s, Engelhardt’s, and Van Kirk’s interpretations of Kant’s
strategy is that they are not fully appreciating the problem of other minds. Solipsists
readily admit that others seem to be choosing on the basis of what is morally required
of them or seem to do what only rational people can do, but they deny that these signs
entail  the  existence  of  a  rational subject  –  with  consciousness,  humanity,  higher
cognitive  faculties,  etc.  –  as  their  cause.  In  fact,  on  Kant’s  own  view,  correlating
transcendental  freedom  with  marks  of  moral  deliberation  or  higher  cognition
establishes nothing of moral significance. If the reality of freedom could be established
based on appearances, then the existence of what seem to be free actions would be
enough  to  establish  my  own  moral  agency.  Yet  Kant’s  theoretical  philosophy  only
makes  room  for  faith  in  freedom.  The  reality  of  freedom  must  be  established
practically,  from my immediate sense of moral constraint – which is different from
merely appearing to be morally constrained.
15 Kant is struggling here with how to approach the problem of other minds given three
central pillars of his philosophy: the distinction between appearances and the thing in
itself, the fact that we are transcendentally free as noumena, and his claim that the
reality of freedom is established only from the first-person, practical perspective. We
can say nothing positive about the thing in itself on the basis of appearances. Kant is
careful  not  to  say  that  we  infer  the  reality  of  others’  freedom  by  the  marks  of
responsibility, because that would violate the epistemic restrictions that he sets out in
the first Kritik. Van Kirk, Engelhardt, and Frierson accept this, but they try in different
ways  to  overcome  the  limits  of  cognition.  Van  Kirk  makes  something  like  a
transcendental  argument from deliberation to reason:  “rationality is  not something
that is inferred from ‘the data’ because there are no data regarding the moral realm
unless rationality is presupposed.” This is true. However, she continues: “Rationality
must be assumed at the outset if a particular type of behavior is to be coherent.”8 It is
precisely the force of this ‘must’ that the solipsist rejects. The appearance that someone
is engaging in moral deliberation or the secondhand claim by someone that they are
bound by moral constraints does not have as its transcendental condition that they are
in fact rationally self-determining because, again, that would render the fact of reason
argument unnecessary. It is also not true. Apparent deliberation is not “coherent” only
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if  one  is  actually  deliberating.  If  it  were,  the  problem  of  other  minds  would  be
nonsensical;  the  mere  appearance  of  rationality  would  make  one  rational.  On  Van
Kirk’s view, someone who seems to be reasoning would already be a counterexample to
solipsism. Yet Kant is no behaviorist.
16  Frierson and Engelhardt  take slightly  different  approaches  from that  of  Van Kirk.
Frierson concedes  that  the  marks  of  rationality  in  others  cannot  justify  a  belief  in
others’ freedom. However, he says that they can justify our moral judgment of others in
a  practical  sense:  “for  the  practical  purposes  of  determining  which  objects  in  the
empirical  world  are  agents  whose  empirical  character  is  grounded  in  a
transcendentally free intelligible character bound by the moral law, the markers … will
be both necessary and sufficient.”9 That is, all I have is the appearance of others, and on
that basis  what  I  have  is  good  enough  to  make  moral  judgments.  They  are  not
“metaphysically sufficient conditions for moral responsibility,” but given the way that I
am constituted and the fact that such marks are correlates of higher faculties in me,
such marks are sufficient – in the world we inhabit, though not in every possible world
– to indicate who else is free and who is not.10 Engelhardt goes beyond this to claim that
use of the regulative idea, applied because of certain apparent behavior, is sufficient to
justify  a  theoretical  commitment  to  others’  personhood  (“knowledge  of  other
persons”), and that on this basis we can derive our moral obligations to them.11
17 There are two problems with these arguments. First, it is wrong to construe a practical
commitment to others simply as a lesser kind of theoretical commitment, or a belief
with  lower  epistemic  standards.  Practical  justification  is  different  from  theoretical
justification;  it  is  not  a  theoretical  justification that  is  “good enough.”  The second,
related problem is that these approaches only push the question back. If the marks of
higher  cognitive  functions  could  establish  freedom  for  practical  purposes,  then  it
would be enough to justify a practical commitment to freedom in me as well. Yet Kant’s
strategy in the second Kritik is  different.  He does not begin with theoretical  claims
regarding  “signs,”  which  are  kinds  of  appearances,  and  move  to  practical
commitments.  Rather,  a first-person, practical commitment (the ‘ought’)  warrants a
first-person, practical commitment to the reality of my own freedom. There is no doubt
that, once I establish the reality of freedom in myself through the fact of reason, then I
can identify correlations between my free will and my character. One could say that my
behavior expresses my freedom, or even that it  confirms (in some sense) freedom’s
practical reality. However, the empirical character cannot be used to warrant a belief in
the existence of free will, either in me or in others, practically or theoretically. The
problem of other minds remains.
 
The Practical Starting Point of the Wissenschaftslehre
18 Fichte’s  idealism  diverges  from  Kant  in  significant  ways,  and  his  philosophical
innovations allow him to dispel the problem of other minds rather than unsuccessfully
trying to answer it, as Kant and his interpreters do. Fichte identifies a problem with the
problem  of  other  minds  itself:  the  assumption  about  what  would  be  a  satisfactory
answer – inference from an apparent characteristic – makes it an impossible problem
to solve and depends on a conception of persons as things that are contingently related.
Attempting  to  provide  a  theoretical  or  cognitive  response  to  the  problem  already
concedes too much. Fichte appeals instead to both our mutual dependence and our
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moral feelings. Despite persistent characterizations of Fichte’s idealism as a form of
subjectivism, one of  his  most  significant departures from Kant is  his  claim that,  in
having  moral  obligations,  I  immediately  take  on  a  relation  to  others.  Fichte  thus
responds to the problem of other minds by analyzing my practical engagement with
the other, not by making a theoretical appeal to appearances.
19 Both the challenge of and solution to the problem of other minds are established in
Fichte’s  metaphilosophy,  where  he  justifies  idealism  by  appealing  to  a  first-person
practical faith in my own freedom. With regard to first principles, Fichte believes that
we  are  faced  with  a  choice  between  two  equally  plausible  but  mutually  exclusive
explanations  of  the  world:  either  the  subject  is  primary  and  posits  the  object  in
opposition to its activity (“idealism” or “criticism”) or there is nothing but inert matter
governed  by  causal  laws,  so  that  even  the  subject  is  determined  by  biological  and
psychological events (“realism” or “dogmatism”). Fichte says that dogmatism cannot
explain the unity of being and seeing, since it cannot account for the consciousness
that  makes  representations  possible  (IWL  20-23  [GA  I/4:195-97]),  and  that  our
immediate sense of our own freedom lends support to the idea that we are not merely
causally determined things (IWL 49 [GA I/4:219]; SE 55-56 [GA I/5:64-65]). Nonetheless,
he concludes that no theoretical  argument could justify idealism for the dogmatist,
who insists that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of material processes and that the
feeling of freedom is an illusion (IWL 15-16 [GA I/4:192]; SE 56 [GA I/5:65]; NM 92-93, 98
[K 15-16, 19]). Apparent signs of free activity – the sort of evidence given by Frierson,
Engelhardt,  and Van Kirk – only serve as indications of the subject’s freedom if  we
presuppose freedom at the outset.
20 Fichte resolves this impasse by saying that people with a strong sense of their own
freedom  are  unable  to  conceive  of  themselves  as  mere  things,  and  thus  that  they
commit themselves to idealism as a kind of assertion of their own freedom: “I will to be
self-sufficient, and I therefore take myself to be so. Such a taking-to-be-true, however,
is faith [Glaube]. Our philosophy therefore begins with an item of faith, and it knows
that it  does this” (SE 31 [GA I/5:43];  see also IWL 18-19 [GA I/4:194-95]).  Like Kant,
Fichte claims that faith in freedom is grounded in or warranted by the immediate sense
of moral constraint (IWL 49 [GA I/4:219]).12 Unlike Kant, Fichte does not think that he
first needs to “make room for faith.” The theoretical account of my existence and the
existence of objects is secondary to and derivative from the practical demand that I be
self-determining.
21 The ethical theory that results from the choice of idealism has autonomy as its moral
ideal.  The I posits the object in response to a check (Anstoβ),  which means that the
object is derived from the I’s activity. As an embodied self, the I confronts a limitation
to its activity that is also a condition of its very subjectivity, for without the object
there would be no subject.  The categorical  imperative,  then,  enjoins  us  to  produce
objects of consciousness in accordance with our own self-legislated laws: we strive to
achieve “absolute self-sufficiency [Selbständigkeit]” (SE 61 [GA I/5:70]) or “conformity with
the pure self” (SK 230n [GA I/2:396n]) by making the world as it ought to be (see also SK
237,  239  [GA  I/2:403,  404-5];  SE  219-20  [GA  I/5:209]).  If  the  external  world  were
completely  in  accordance  with  the  absolute,  then  there  would  be  no  distinction
between subject and object, no resistance to the I’s activity. Therefore, the I engages in
an endless “striving [Streben]” for a moral ideal that, so long as the I is finite, it can
never achieve (SK 231 [GA I/2:397]; see also SE 198-99 [GA I/5:191]).
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 Fichte on Our Ignorance of Others’ Subjectivity
22 Fichte’s appeal to the sense of myself as free only establishes my freedom, as it does for
Kant.  I  become  self-conscious  by  positing  myself  as  an  I  through  the  activity  of
thinking,  and  I  represent  the  seemingly  mind-independent  world  by  setting  it  in
opposition to self-consciousness, a Not-I distinguished from the I. If the world is the
result of my activity, as Fichte claims it is,  then it seems to follow that even (what
appear to be) other people are posited by me as things for (my) consciousness. In Clavis
Fichtiana,  Jean Paul satirizes Fichte on this point, saying that I distinguish others as
representations within consciousness merely to provide me with objects of moral duty:
they are nothing but “heraldic figures in the painted Not-I,” or “the dead wax museum
of human forms.”13
23  Fichte acknowledges the risk here and says that, according to his form of idealism, it is
true  that  other  people  are  posited  by  the  I  as  representations.  Thus,  from  the
theoretical standpoint, there is no answer to the problem of other minds:
I  am aware of appearances in space to which I transfer the concept of myself;  I
think of them as beings like myself. Speculative philosophy, taken to its conclusion,
has taught me or will teach me that these supposed rational beings outside of me
are nothing but products of  my own mind,  that  I  just  happen to be compelled,
according to demonstrable laws of my thought, to present the concept of myself
outside of myself and that, by the same laws, this concept can only be transferred to
certain determinate intuitions. (VM 76 [GA I/6:262])
24 On this view, the appearance of other people is due to the activity of my understanding,
with which I posit things according to certain rules. Fichte is conceding that idealism
poses a special problem that Kant has failed to answer. He rejects the appeal to “‘signs
which  distinguish  [Unterscheidungszeichen]  rational  beings  from  nonrational  ones  …
derived from experience,’” because even the “egoist” recognizes such signs without
granting that they are evidence of others’ personhood (EPW 154 [GA I/3:34]). Fichte
concludes that theoretical reason has no adequate response to solipsism: “The most
that experience can teach us is that there are effects which resemble the effects of
rational causes. It cannot, however, teach us that the causes in question actually exist
as rational beings in themselves” (EPW 154 [GA I/3:35]). Even if they look or act as I do,
no  inference  can  be  made  from  the  appearances  of  others  (“signs”)  to  their  self-
consciousness or their humanity. If  the problem of other minds is to be adequately
addressed, it “must be answered on the basis of practical principles” (EPW 154 [GA I/
3:35]). There is an apparent parallel here to the dogmatism/idealism divide: there is no
theoretical argument that will decide the matter, which gives us a sense of the limits of
theoretical reason and the need to call on other resources.
 
“No Thou, no I”: The Aufforderung
25 Fichte’s first innovation relevant to the problem of other minds is his doctrine of the
summons. He dispels the problem, in part, by establishing my practical engagement
with others as necessary for my existence as a  person and an individual.  However,
because  of  Fichte’s  strict distinction  between  rights  and  moral  obligations,  the
summons has only limited implications: although the summons establishes the other as
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a subject, and thus overcomes metaphysical solipsism, it does not establish my moral
obligations to them, leaving ethical solipsism – or perhaps ethical egoism, the idea that
my moral obligations are merely self-regarding – intact.
26 My relation  to  the  other  emerges  in  the  context  of  my ability  to affect  the  world
through my actions. Specifically,  my subjectivity depends on another rational being
issuing a “summons [Aufforderung] to self-activity” (SE 209 [GA I/5:201]). Fichte explains
the process in detail in the Grundlage des Naturrechts (FNR 29-39 [GA I/3:340-48]). He
begins by saying that, to be a “person,” I  must be free in a formal sense, which he
defines as the ability to set ends and to act on my concept of them to cause changes in
the world: formal freedom is “absolute spontaneity” in “the act of forming the concept
of an intended efficacy outside us, or the concept of an end [Zweck]” (FNR 9, 20, 53 [GA
I/3:319, 331, 361]; see also FNR 48 [GA I/3:357]).14 In addition, to be an “individual,” I
must not only have formal freedom but must be conscious of myself as a discrete source
of effective agency, set apart from others (FNR 40 [GA I/3:349-50]).
27 The  object  becomes  a  representation  for  me  through  the  activity  of  judgment
(theoretical  reason),  and it  is  transformed or  affected by  my formally  free  activity
(practical reason). As noted earlier, to be self-conscious, I must also separate myself
from the object in consciousness, or must posit it as outside of and distinct from me as
a  subject.  Thus  the  object  depends  on  the  theoretical  and  practical  activity  of  the
subject that posits it, but the subject also depends on its relation to the object as an
independent thing (FNR 29 [GA I/3:340]). This poses a problem, since the object must be
both determined in itself (to make the subject possible) and determinable through the
subject (as a posited representation). In the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, Fichte talks
about this in terms of the subject’s need for a “goal [or end, Zweck]” and the fact that a
goal must constrain or demand something of me, yet I must select a specific goal to
pursue; I am passive in the former sense and active in the latter (NM 352 [K 177-78]).
28 To remove this contradiction, Fichte says that the self must become an object to itself –
specifically, it must be the object of self-consciousness – while also being determinable
as an object (or body) through its own subjective activity. This is achieved by thinking
“of the subject’s being-determined as its being determined to be self-determining, i.e., as a
summons to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to exercise its efficacy” (FNR 31 [GA
I/3:342]). Another rational being, or “a general mass of rational beings as such” (NM
351 [K 177]), imposes a normative “demand [Anforderung]” that I exercise my freedom
(FNR 33 [GA I/3:343]). For example, if someone asks me to stop hurting him, then I have
to decide whether or not to stop. By responding as a self-conscious subject and deciding
on a reason to act,  I  become responsible for what I  do.  As Allen Wood puts it,  the
summons provides “a ground or reason for doing something (for doing what we are
summoned – asked, invited, required – to do).”15 Is the fact that he is hurt enough of a
reason for me to stop doing what I am doing? No matter how I decide, by weighing the
reasons I take on the action as my own. The other’s demand gives me what may be a
compelling reason to restrain myself: I should not hurt someone unnecessarily. Thus
Fichte claims that the principle of right is deducible from mutual recognition: in calling
on me,  the  summoner  takes  me to  be  a  responsible  agent,  and in  response  to  the
summons, I “recognize [anerkennen]” him as a rational being like me (FNR 42-43 [GA I/
3:352-54]). Like Engelhardt, Fichte says that I use reflective judgment to decide whether
given effects – actions not governed solely by instinct, an expressive face, and so on –
can  be  explained  only  with  reference  to  a  rational cause  (FNR 35-36,  76-78  [GA I/
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3:345-46, 381-83]).16 The crucial difference is that, for Fichte, I must recognize another
rational being as a condition of my own self-consciousness. Once I see the person this
way, I then have a choice whether to limit the exercise of my freedom out of respect for
his right not to be harmed.
29 Fichte notes that I can either heed or resist the summons (NM 355 [K 179]; GA IV/2:179),
but in either case, I actualize my freedom. That is, if I choose to do what is demanded of
me, then I limit myself through a free act of self-determination, and thus become free;
and if I refuse to limit myself, then that refusal is itself a choice and an act of becoming
responsible for myself: “By now proceeding contrary to the demand it is aware of and
refraining from acting, it likewise chooses freely between acting and not acting” (FNR
33 [GA I/3:343]; see also NM 351-52 [K 177]). Fichte decenters the primacy of the subject
in the sense that the summons of the other is inescapable and it is imposed on me from
without. In response to the demand, I must make a choice, and in making a choice I
assert my freedom.
30 By  demanding  something  of  me,  the  summoner  is  setting  ends  and  attempting  to
achieve them – that is, her attempt to affect me through the summons is a purposive
act (FNR 36-37, 43 [GA I/3:346, 352]). Because she has formal freedom, and because I
become aware that I can affect her through my actions, I realize that I ought to respond
with a corresponding limitation and restriction on my own freedom, and I engage her
in a relation of right (Rechtsverhältnis).  I  have rights because, in acting as a rational
agent, “I ascribe to myself a sphere for my freedom from which I exclude the other”;
and, correlatively, I must respect her rights because I “ascribe a sphere to the other from
which I exclude myself” (FNR 48 [GA I/3:357]; see also RPP 316 [GA I/3:223]; FNR 53-54
[GA I/3:361-62]). Anticipating Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Fichte says that, since my
I-hood depends on the other as another subject (specifically a summoner), I would be
undermining the condition for  the possibility  of  my freedom if  I  were to deny her
freedom and treat her merely as a thing (SE 210 [GA I/5:201-2]).
31 Rather than following Kant in deriving his philosophy of right from the categorical
imperative (see, e.g., MM 6:214),17 Fichte attempts a transcendental deduction of the
principles of right as conditions for the possibility of self-consciousness (EPW 408-9 [GA
III/2:387  (no.  305)]).  The  summons  is  necessary  for  self-consciousness,  and  mutual
recognition as self-conscious subjects is necessary for a relation of right. The derivation
of rights proceeds as follows. Insofar as I am called upon to exercise my formal freedom
and to act (or not act) in a determinate way, I must be a body in relation to other bodies
(NM 457, 469 [K 233-34, 241]). The body is the will viewed from a different perspective,
as a thing and the means through which I can effect change in the world, since only
matter can affect matter (NM 321, 326-27, 458 [K 160, 163-64, 234]). I then posit the
other as a thing opposed to consciousness, and it is this thing – the body – that makes it
possible for me actually to apply the bare concept of rights in real cases. That is why
Fichte begins his “deduction of the applicability of the concept of right” with the claim
that “the rational being cannot posit itself as an individual that has efficacy without
ascribing to itself, and thereby determining, a material body” (FNR 53 [GA I/3:361]). By
apprehending myself as a limited body in relation to another body, I move from what
Angelica  Nuzzo  calls  “intellectual  internal  recognition”  of  the  other  to  “practical
external recognition” of the other in an actual relation of right.18 The body of the other
is both something that I can affect through my actions and something that I am called
upon to respect as the basis of the other’s sphere of freedom (NM 76, 457 [K 233-34]).
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Fichte thus lists two “original rights [Urrechte]”: the right over my body and the right to
act freely in the world (FNR 87, 107-8 [GA I/3:390, 407-8]). A mutual relation of right
follows from the intersubjective engagement that makes individuality possible, and the
embodiment that follows from the commitment to myself as a free and effective agent
in association with other persons.
 
Limited Implications of the Aufforderung19
32 As  I  have  shown,  Fichte  establishes  two  points  in  his  philosophy  of  right  that  are
relevant  to  the  problem  of  other  minds.  First,  Fichte  says  that  my  existence  as  a
(formally) free agent depends on the summons of the other. I can be a self-conscious
subject only in relation to other subjects: “No Thou, no I” (SK 172-73 [GA I/2:337]; see
also IWL 61 [GA I/4:229]; SE 209-10 [GA I/5:201]).
1. To be a person, I must be the addressee of a summons, and the summons is only
possible if the summoner is both rational and free.
33 Because the existence of at least one other subject is a condition for the possibility of
my self-consciousness, Fichte believes that he has given a transcendental justification
for the existence of other minds. This means that metaphysical solipsism is practically
dissolved.
2. In the context of this practical engagement by means of the summons, there is no
real problem of other minds.
34 Indeed, in the Sittenlehre, Fichte says that the summons is the only compelling response
to the problem of other minds: it is “the sole sufficient reason for inferring that there is
a rational cause outside of us” (SE 210 [GA I/5:201]).  Because my self-consciousness
depends on the other, the fact that I am a subject already attests to the existence of
other subjects.  Therefore,  the summons introduces a second-person standpoint that
challenges the first-person approach to freedom (by means of the fact of reason) that
Kant takes.
35 Stephen Darwall and Robert Williams claim that this has direct ethical implications.20
They contend that  the  summons establishes  not  merely  a  relation of  right,  but  an
intersubjective basis for Fichte’s ethics, and specifically for our moral duties toward
others.
3.  The summons establishes  the  summoner’s  moral  considerability,  and on that
basis my moral duties are established.
36 Darwall challenges Fichte’s distinction between right and morality. He insists that the
summons  is  a  kind  of  reason-giving,  and  that  to  comprehend  it  as  such  is  to
acknowledge the authority of the other to make moral demands on me, not merely
conditional rights claims.21 And Williams compares Fichte to Emmanuel Levinas in his
radical  disruption of  a  first-person appeal  to  reason.22 Levinas claims that  the core
ethical experience is the encounter with the face of the other, in which the subject
finds herself responsible for the other even without having recognized the other as an
alter ego.23 Similarly, for Williams’s Fichte, I am morally obligated to the other simply
by virtue of the fact that I am provoked by them, and this is a necessary provocation
because my existence as a subject depends on my being summoned by the other.
37 The problem with these interpretations is that they run counter to Fichte’s so-called
independence or separation thesis. By the time of the Grundlage des Naturrechts,24 Fichte
insists,  unlike  Kant,  that  ethics  and  legality  have  distinct  foundations:  “the
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philosophical doctrine of right” is “a separate science standing on its own” (FNR 11 [GA
I/3:321]).  As  Daniel  Breazeale  and  Frederick  Neuhouser  emphasize,  the  normative
constraints  that  are  integral  to  the  relation  of  right  and  that  are  implicit  in  the
Aufforderung are not matters of  moral  duty. 25 Mutual  recognition does establish the
social character of human beings, but the resulting legal restrictions on my freedom
are only binding if I commit myself to maximizing external freedom. That is, unlike
moral  obligations,  which  are  unconditional,  legal  obligations  are  conditional  on
whether I choose to live in a community with others (RPP 314-16 [GA I/3:222-24]; NM
470-71 [K 242]). To be sure, enlightened self-interest motivates me to live with others
and to form laws under which our freedom is maximized, but, because this does not
follow necessarily from the nature of reason itself, the decision is “arbitrary or optional
[willkürlich]” (FNR 10 [GA I/3:320]; see also FNR 11-12, 81-83 [GA I/3:321-22, 386-87]).
Fichte  says  that  my  respect  for  others  as  rights-bearers  is  merely  a  matter  of
“theoretical consistency”: knowing that the other person is like me, and knowing that I
want to be treated in a certain way – I demand my rights – I am rationally compelled to
treat them the same way (FNR 44 [GA I/3:353-54]; see also FNR 11 [GA I/3:321-22]; VM
78 [GA I/6:264]).
38 In addition, the relation of right is supposed to preserve each party’s formal freedom –
that is, the capacity to orient ourselves according to concepts representing ends – but it
does not have any specifically moral end in view. Unlike morality, the law does not
universally  command  or  prohibit  particular  actions;  rather,  it  permits  me to  act
however I want, even immorally, as long as I do so within my private sphere (FNR 50,
179 [GA I/3:359, I/4:17]).  I  incur properly moral obligations, by contrast, owing to a
rationally mandated, not interpersonally solicited, commitment to material freedom,
not formal freedom. That is, I am morally constrained to strive for autonomy, to act on
the basis of a self-legislated law, so I ought to determine my ends based only on their
fitness for furthering the self-sufficiency of reason. The distinctive moral demand is
made by my higher self, not by the other.
 
The Practical Commitment to Others
39 Treating the problem of other minds as an epistemic problem inevitably lands us in
solipsism, or at least risks it. A theoretical approach is bound to fail, since it begins with
the assumption that the other is an object of knowledge, or merely a representation for
consciousness.  Kant  cannot  then  infer  the  humanity  of  someone  on  the  basis  of
apparent  signs.  Although  Fichte’s  practical  appeal  to  the  summons  in  some  sense
dissolves  the  threat  of  solipsism,  making the  other  into  a  formally  free  subject,  it
establishes  the  other  merely  as  another  consciousness,  and at  best  another  rights-
bearer, rather than an object of moral obligation.
40 What  both  approaches  have  in  common  is  that  they  begin  with  a  commitment  to
others’ humanity and they try to infer our ethical obligations from that. Kant moves
from signs to humanity, which, by means of the formula of humanity, entails that we
have  other-regarding  duties  to  them.  And  Darwall  and  Williams  move  from  the
summons to the authority to make the summons, which entails that they are rational
beings  to  whom  we  have  other-regarding  duties.  This  is  the  typical  direction  of
inference in the history of Western philosophy: once we establish the other’s existence
as a person, then we can deduce that we have moral obligations to them.
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41 Fichte’s  revolutionary  approach  upends  this.  Though  my  comprehension  of  the
summons entails my recognition of another subject in an abstract sense, it does not
address the question of how I come to recognize a specific person as someone to whom
I have moral obligations. Fichte claims that the distinctively moral relationship follows
not from my determination that the other is a subject, but from moral feeling. That is, I
know that others are rational beings with dignity because I have duties to them; I do
not have duties to them because they are rational beings.
42 Earlier I mentioned that the aim of morality is absolute self-sufficiency. Because I am a
finite, imperfectly rational being, I cannot apprehend the moral law (as a law of pure
reason) directly; instead, the law affects me through what Fichte calls my conscience
(Gewissen) by means of moral feeling (SE 198 [GA I/5:190-91];  see also SE 101-5, 148,
158-68 [GA I/5:104-9, 146, 155-64]; NM 469 [K 241-42]). Conscience guides us to do what
is right: as Fichte puts it, “Feeling decides [Das Gefühl entscheidet]” (SE 198 [GA I/5:190]).
To be sure, I exist as a self-conscious being (“my first state”) because of the summons of
the other, and thus my self-consciousness “is not determined through my freedom, but
through my connection with another rational being.” As a moral agent, though, I am
beholden  only  to  reason:  “What  I  become  or  do  not  become  from  this  point  on,
however,  depends  purely  and  simply  and  completely  on  me  alone”  (SE  211  [GA  I/
5:202]). The duties that I have, including other-regarding duties, are the result of the
moral drive as it expresses itself in feeling through my conscience. This is a dramatic
return to the first-person perspective.
43 In the Sittenlehre,  Fichte reminds us of the relation of right among free beings, and
notes that, in response to the summons, I become “merely a rational being in general,”
and I relate to summoners as possible rather than actual individuals (SE 211-14 [GA I/
5:202-4]). Fichte’s reasoning here is not especially clear. He seems to be saying that the
generality of the summons makes it incapable of establishing a moral relationship. The
summons gets us merely to “the fact of I-hood” rather than making me “a particular
rational being.” The former is a “universal” limitation, not a “particular limitation” (SE
214 [GA I/5:204]). The dependence of self-consciousness on the summons may give me
grounds for thinking that there is some other rational being out there, but it does not
give me reason to think that this is a rational being and that is not. It entitles me to use
(or offers a deduction of) the concept of “another rational being,” but does not provide
me with a criterion (schema) for applying it.
44 The problem with this interpretation is that the summons only functions as a summons
if we encounter a specific other whom we recognize as a rational being with formal
freedom. As noted above, Fichte lists some of the criteria we use to distinguish rational
beings from things that are not rational: actions not governed solely by instinct, an
expressive face, and so on (see FNR 76-78 [GA I/3:381-83]). Wood claims that Fichte is
giving a schematism so that we can apply the concept of a rational cause empirically.26
Using reflective judgment, I  make “the inference [Schluβ]  to a rational cause” and I
treat the person as “a particular [bestimmten] rational being,” not some undifferentiated
mass (FNR 36, 42 [GA I/3:346, 352]).
45 Perhaps a better way of understanding Fichte’s notion of particularity in the Sittenlehre
is  in  keeping with  the  independence  thesis.  What  is  missing  in  the  account  of  the
summons,  which  is  only  given  with  moral  feeling,  is  genuinely  moral  concern,  as
opposed to juridical concern. Instead of merely justifying the existence of the other,
which the summons does accomplish, moral feeling transforms the relationship into
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one of indebtedness and obligation rather than general permissibility regarding the
movement of my body. I only need to engage them in a relation of right if I participate
in a community and if they also agree to respect my rights. Even if I become a subject
through another (someone must summon me), I need not consciously accept that fact or
acknowledge the dignity of a particular person (I ought to respect you), so it need not
make any difference to my commitments. Because of the limitation of the summons,
Fichte then asks:  “Can they, however,  be actual for  me? I.e.,  can I  perceive them as
actual beings, and if so, how can I perceive them?” (SE 212 [GA I/5:203]).
46 Fichte seems to be addressing an issue that is a focus of critical race theory. We can
establish that others exist as conscious beings, but whether that puts any obligation on
me is in some sense ultimately my decision. The notion of a “person” is a very slippery
concept.  Charles  Mills  uses  the  language  of  “subperson”  to  get  at  someone who is
recognized  as  sharing  characteristics  with  whites/the  privileged  without  being
recognized as a full person.27 Fichte seems to be getting at some of that same ambiguity:
we  think  “person”  is  merely  descriptive,  something  that  theoretical  reason  could
establish or that could be transcendentally derived. However, really it has normative
dimensions  that  get  established  in  other  ways:  for  Fichte,  through  personal  moral
feeling,  and  for  critical  race  theorists,  through  contingent,  only  semi-cognitive
processes of habituation and normalization.
47 According to Fichte, the considerability of the other as an actual someone to whom I
have  distinctly  ethical  obligations  depends  on  my sense  of  duty.  That  is,  I  feel  an
obligation to  respect  the other,  and from that  feeling I  “infer” the existence of  an
actual being with humanity: “we inwardly feel that our acting is being repulsed. In this
case, even our drive toward acting is limited, and from this we infer [schlieβen] that
there is freedom outside of us” (SE 213 [GA I/5:204]; cf. FNR 36 [GA I/3:346], cited above).
28 The appearance of the other as an other is secondary to the immediate, unreflective,
and intimate feeling that I owe something to them, in contrast to mere objects:
There  are  certain  points  [Punkte]  beyond  which  I  should  not  proceed  with  my
freedom, and this ought-not [Nichtsollen] reveals itself to me immediately. I explain
to myself these points [beyond which I ought not to proceed] by appealing to the
presence of other free beings and their free effects in the sensible world. (SE 214
[GA I/5:205])
48 Conscience is an expression of what is rationally required of me. What I discover in
encountering these “points” of resistance is that reason works through both me and
others as tools of the moral law to strive for a complete moral system within which we
recognize one another as “member[s] of the community of rational beings” – that is, I
respect the humanity in them as an end in itself and help to further their purposes (SE
244 [GA I/5:230]; see also SE 217-19 [GA I/5:208-9]).
49 As Wood rightly notes, the second-person perspective is not part of the foundation of
Fichte’s ethics, but arises only in the application of the moral law.29 What testifies to
the existence of others as moral subjects, and what obligates me to further their ends,
is not their appearance, which is secondary, but the sense of obligation that I have to
them.30 Fichte thus gives a practical (and specifically moral) response to the problem of
other minds. Kant says that my immediate sense of moral constraint justifies a practical
commitment  to  my  own  freedom;  Fichte  says  that  my  immediate  sense  of  moral
obligation justifies a practical commitment to the freedom of others.
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50 Earlier I quoted a passage from the Bestimmung des Menschen in which Fichte claims that
speculative philosophy cannot establish the existence of other minds (VM 76 [GA I/
6:262]).  He follows this passage by giving his alternative,  claiming that my sense of
myself as a moral agent is necessarily a sense of myself as an individual in relation to
other moral agents:
But the voice of my conscience [Gewissen] calls to me: whatever these beings may be
in and for themselves, you ought to treat them as self-subsistent, free, autonomous
beings  completely  independent  of  you.  …  I  will  therefore  always  regard  those
beings as beings which exist for themselves and are there independently of me, as
beings which set themselves purposes and carry them out. From this standpoint I
will  not  be able to see them any other way,  and that  speculation [according to
which they are mere representations] will disappear before my eyes like an empty
dream. (VM 76 [GA I/6:262])
51 No theoretical argument, including the appeal to signs, can successfully demonstrate
that  some  of  my  representations  are  representations  of  conscious  beings.  But  the
failure of theoretical reasoning here is irrelevant given my sense of obligation to those
beings  (and not  those  representations).  My conception of  others  as  rational  beings
follows from my duty to treat them as such.31
52 The moral feeling of considerability is not a theoretical proposition. If one asks for a set
of propositions that prove that there are other morally considerable people out there,
which is presupposed by the problem of other minds, trying to answer that question
would already be engaging the problem in the wrong way – thus conceding too much
from the beginning. The challenge is badly formulated. It assumes that the question is
amenable  to  theoretical  proof  –  something  that  Kant  himself,  in  distinguishing
appearances from the thing in itself,  showed not  to  be the case.  Fichte dispels  the
problem of other minds, rather than trying to solve it, by rejecting this foundational
assumption and providing a separate, practical proof.
53 Because of  the immediacy of  the feeling of  obligation,  Fichte does not to treat this
founding practical assumption as a claim to be justified. I consider other rational beings
to be persons because I must  do so given my ethical  commitments,  just  as I  accept
idealism over dogmatism because I must do so given the kind of person I am (IWL 20 [GA
I/4:195]).  Retrospectively,  Fichte’s  philosophical  account  of  subjectivity  and  the
summons explains or makes comprehensible why we have this relation to others (IWL 38n
[GA I/4:210-11n]), but it is not meant to justify a moral feeling that is immediate and in
no need of justification from the first-person, practical perspective.
 
Conclusion: The Coherence of Fichte’s View
54 It  is  now  commonly  accepted  among  Fichte  scholars  that  intersubjectivity  plays  a
central  role  in  his  philosophy,  and that  the  longstanding  charge  of  subjectivism is
misguided. What has been missing is an appreciation of how Fichte responds to the
problem of other minds. The summons dispels metaphysical solipsism, to be sure, but
establishing others’ distinctively moral considerability is a result of conscience, as felt
from  the  first-person  perspective.  This  recapitulates  his  practical  strategy  for
establishing the truth of idealism, and in that sense it is of a piece with the starting
point of the Wissenschaftslehre. It is also more consistent with the fact of reason strategy
by  which  Kant  establishes  my  own  humanity  than  the  appeal  to  signs  made  by
Engelhardt, Van Kirk, and Frierson. Although I do not have the space to defend it here,
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I  believe  that  Fichte’s  view more  accurately  captures  the  phenomenology  of  moral
experience.  The  metaphysical  question  of  whether  someone  is  in  fact  morally
considerable is  secondary to and,  in a practical  sense,  is  decided by our immediate
ethical relationship with them.32
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ABSTRACTS
The present paper examines the problem of attributing mental predicates to anyone but myself.
Traditionally, this has been a major issue at the intersection of epistemology and ethics, because
whether we should consider someone in our moral deliberations is often thought to depend on
their cognitive abilities or their capacity for consciousness. For both Kant and Fichte, we have
direct moral duties only to other rational beings. The fact that the other is present to us as a
representation (for Kant) or as a Not-I that is posited in opposition to the I (for Fichte) threatens
our supposed moral obligations to them and risks a form of metaphysical solipsism and moral
egoism.  The  bindingness  of  interpersonal  obligations  depends  on overcoming the  separation
between me and other persons. It will be shown that in order to establish the other as a morally
considerable being, Fichte reverses the direction of implication: I do not derive my moral duties
from others’ personhood; rather, others’ personhood follows from my immediate sense of moral
obligation toward them. The way that the problem of other minds is posed presupposes that the
only appropriate answer would be a series of propositions that establishes the existence of other
morally considerable beings outside of myself. The immediate moral feeling of considerability,
however, is not a proposition. It will be argued that Fichte thus provides a radically different
alternative to Kant’s approach. The problem of other minds is not answered or solved but is
rather dispelled in Fichte’s philosophy by the feeling of moral obligation and the recognition of
others as the object of our obligations.
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